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EXTENSION OF TIME FOR PAYMENT AS RELEASING
SURETIES ON NOTE IN KENTUCKY

By C.R OusLEY, JR.*
Prior to the enactment of the Negotiable Instrument Act,1
Kentucky followed the well-settled common law rule that a valid
contract made between the payee or holder of a note and the
principal debtor therein, wh.ereby time for payment of the instrument was extended beyond its original maturity, released
sureties on the note from all liability if the agreement for extension was made without their consent. 2 The rule is the same as to
other obligations. 3
The purpose of this memorandum is to ascertain whether
or not that well-settled principle of suretyship has been abrogated in Kentucky by the enactment of the Negotiable Instrument Act, and, if so, the reasons therefor.
* LL. B., University of Louisville, 1931; Atorney-at-Law, Louisville,2 Ky.
Acts 1904, c. 102, p. 213; Carroll's Kentucky Statutes (1930),
Sec. 3720b-1 et seq.
2Norton v. Roberts, 4 T. B. Mon. 491 (1827); Robinson v. Offutt,
7 T. B. Mon. 540 (1828); Clark v. Patton d- Sharp, 4 J. J. Marsh. 33,
20 Am. Dec. 203 (1830); Farrners' & Mechanics' Bank of Lexington v.
Crosby, 4 T. J. Marsh. 367 (1830); Sparks v. Hall, 4 J. J. Marsh. 31
(1830); Helm's Adm. v. Young, et al., 9 B. Mon. 394 (1849); Robinson,
et al. v. Miller, 2 Bush 179 (1867); Preston v. Henning, 6 Bush 556
(1869); Wilson v. Davies, 5 Ky. Op. 725 (1872); White v. Tuber, I
K. L. R. 64 (1880) (abstract opinion); Blades v. Robbins, 9 K. L. R.
197 (1887) (abstract opinion); Harris-Seller Banking Co. v. Bond, 20
K. L. R. 897, 47 S. W. 764 (1898); Columbia Finance & Trust Co., Trustee v. Mitchell's Adm., 24 K. L. R. 1844, 72 S. IV. 350 (1903).
'The rule was recognized in the following cases although other
inequitable dealings were generally present where sureties released:
Craig v. Cox, 2 Bibb. 309, 5 Am. Dec. 609 (1811) (forthcoming bond);
Jones v. Bullock, 3 Bibb. 467 (1817) (injunction bond); Edwards v.
Coleman, 6 T. B. Mon. 567 (1828) (appearance bond); Sneeds's Exr. v.
White, 3 J. J. Marsh. 525, 20 Am. Dec. 175 (1830) (replevin bond);
Reid v. Watts, 4 J. J. Marsh. 441 (1830) (recognizance); Cooper, et ux.
v. Fisher,7 J. J. Marsh. 396 (1832) (executor's bond); Blandford'sAdm.
v. Barger, 9 Dana 22 (1839) (replevin bond); Tudor v. Goodloe, 1
B. Mon. 322 (1841) (nature of bond uncertain); Kenningham, et al. v.
Bedford, 1 B. Mon. 325 (1841) (nature of bond uncertain); Mt. Sterling
Imp. Co. v. Cockrill, et al., 24 K. L. R. 1151, 70 S. W. 842 (1902) (supersedeas bond); U. S. F. & G. Co. v. Boyd, 29 K. L. R. 598, 94 S. 'W. 35
(1906) (supersedeas bond);, Caperton's Exr., et al. v. State Bank &
Trust Co., Trustee, et al., 146 Ky. 415, 142 S. W. 1021 (1912) (bond
of special commissioner of court); Henderson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 233
Ky. 217, 25 S. W. (2d) 359 (1930) (employee's fidelity bond).
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While it has been said that the foundation of the rule is not
based on actual damage to the sureties and that the question of
damage is therefore immaterial, 4 it has been pointed out that the
rule is necessarily based upon the idea of prejudice to the sureties-as otherwise there would be no reason for releasing themand that the law will presume that the sureties have been
prejudiced by such an extension. 5 Although the result reached
is the same, the latter view seems more logical.
The Court early intimated that some damage to the sureties
should be shown before the rule was enforced.6 An able legal
scholar has quite recently expressed the same thougbhtj But it
is settled that damage need not be proven.
The reason given for the discharge of the sureties is that
the original contract to which they were a party has been
altered without their consent and they are therefore precluded
by an agreement, to which they were not a party, from either
paying the debt at its maturity and proceeding against the principal debtor or from compelling him to pay the note at the
maturity to which they consented.8 Such reason, it is evident,
has back of it one and only one idea, and that is the material
damage to which sureties would be subjected in event their discharge was not authorized.
As the payee or holder has made a new agreement with the
principal debtor, in order for that agreement to be enforcible,
it is essential that it contain the necessary elements of any other
valid contract. The agreement for an extension must be for a
definite time ;9 it must be based upon a valid consideration.' 0
'.Norton v. Roberts, supra, note 2; Clark v. Patton & Sharp, supra,
note 2; Hays v. Twyman, 8 Ky. Op. 473 (1875); White v. Tuber, supra,
note 2; Wilson v. Briggs, Swift & Co., 4 K. L. R. 534 (1882).
Daviess County Bank & Trust Co. v. Wright, 129 Ky. 21, 110 S. W.
361, 17 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 1121 (1908) (an able opinion by Chief Justice
O'Rear).
OBrown v. Wright, 7 T. B. Mon. 397 (1828); Vooper, et ux. v.
Fisher, supra, note 3.
7 Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 H. L. R. 113, 117.
'Norton v. Roberts, supra, note 2; Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank of
Lexington v. Crosby, supra, note 2; Cooper, et ux. v. F"isher, supra, note
3; Preston v. Henning, supra, note 2; Bringar's Adm. v. Phillips, 1
B. Mon. 283, 36 Am. Dec. 575 (1841); Alley v. Hopkins, 98 Ky. 668,
34 S. W. 13 (1896); Daviess County Bank & Trust Co. v. Wright, supra,
note 5.
'Robinson v. Miller, supra, note 2; Offutt v. Glass, 4 Bush 486
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It is well-settled that the creditor may give whatever indulgence he wishes and be as lenient and passive as he desires
to the principal debtor, without releasing the sureties, as long as
a definite agreement is not made for such indulgence, leniency or
passiveness."Thus it is seen that for nearly one hundred years prior to
the enactment of the Negotiable Instrument Act in 1904, Kentucky followed the common law rule of suretyship that an extension of time given to the principal debtor, based upon a binding
contract, released the sureties from their obligations on the note,
if made without their consent. The rule was considered as a
definite part of the law of suretyship without interfering with
laws relating to negotiable instruments.
(1868) ;Allgaier & Milton v. Scott, 3 Ky. Op. 268 (1869); Alley v. Hopkins, supra, note 8.
10The early authorities presumably held no consideration was
necessary. Morton v. Roberts, supra, note 2.
Payment of legal rate of interest in advance is consideration.
Kenningham v. Bedford, supra, note 3; Preston v. Henning, supra, note
2; Lebus v. Robbins, 8 K. L. R. 966 (1887) (abstract opinion); Morehead v. Citizens Deposit Bank, 130 Ky. 414, 113 S. W. 501 (1908).
A promise to pay usurious interest is not binding. Tudor v. GoodZoe, supra, note 3; Pyke's Adm. v. Clark, 3 B. Mon. 262 (1842); Scott
v. Hall, et al., 6 B. Mon. 285 (1845); Duncan v. Reed, 8 B. Mon. 382
(1848); Allgaier & Milton v. Scott, supra, note 9; Millitz v. Schuff, 5
Ky. Op. 118 (1872). "Its, payment cannot be enforced, and while the
promise to pay usury, and not the payment thereof, constitutes the
consideration relied on, it is wholly illegal and invalid, although it may
have been partly executed, because its full execution cannot be enforced,, and therefore the contract for indulgence is not obligatory on
either party." Pattonv. Shanklin, 14 B. Mon. 13 (1853).
The actual payment of usurious interest in advance is consideration. Kenninghanz v. Bedford, supra, note 3; Exchange Bank o7 Ky. v.
Elgin, 7 K. L. R. 608 (1886); Blades v. Robbins, supra, note 2; Young
v. New Farmers' Bank, 102 Ky. 257, 43 S. W. 473 (1897).
Payment of past due interest not consideration. Levy v. Roth, 31
K. L. R. 704, 103 S. W. 292 (1907).
Entry of credit by principal debtor on open account of creditor
not consideration. Anderson v. Mannon, et al., 7 B. Mon. 217 (1846).
Agreement of creditor to accept monthly payments not consideration. Thatcher v. Pagan, 11 K. L. R. 903 (1890) (abstract opinion.)
Payment on another note due creditor not consideration. Western's Adm. v. Perkins, 2 Ky. Op. 495 (1868).
Payment on principal of note when due upon promise of forbearance on the balance then due is not consideration. Evans v. Partin, 22
K. L. R. 20, 56 S. W. 648 (1900).
11
Norton v. Roberts, supra, note 2; Stout v. Ashton, 5 T. B. Mon.
252 (1827); Ross v. Clore, 3 Dana 189 (1835); Western's Adm. v.
Perkins,, svpra, note 10; Krupp v. St. Martinus Bitter Verein, 21,
K. L. R. 938, 53 S. W. 648 (1S99); Barber v. Ruggles, 27 K. L. R. 1077,
87 S. W. 785 (1905); Daviess County Bank & Trust Co. v. Wright,
supra, note 5.
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After the enactment of the Act, and up to 1915, the question of the effect of an extension of time upon sureties was before the Court in five cases. In three of the ae,12 wherein
the Act was not mentioned the common law rule was specifically
recognized. In the fourth case, 13 the Court, while holding that
the Act excluded the defense of presentment, demand and protest as to the surety, did not say that the Act excluded the defense of extension of time and held that the evidence "of the appellant failed to sustain it, and that of the appellee wholly
disproved it." In the fifth case, 14 wherein the Act was mentioned on the question of limitations, the Court again held that
the evidence did not sustain the contention that an extension of
time had been granted.
In 1915, in the case of First State Bank of Nortonville v.
Wil/iams,1 5 for the first time, certain sections of the Act were
relied on as not releasing sureties by an extension of time
granted to the principal debtor. One Brasher executed a note to
the Bank which Williams signed as surety, as the Bank knew.
When sued on the note Williams pleaded that he was a surety,
and that the time of payment had been extended without his
knowledge or consent and that he was thereby released.
The Court quoted Section 119 of the Act, providing how the
instrument is discharged, and Section 120, providing how parties
secondarily liable are released, and then said:
"The Act thus specifies how the instrument, and consequently the
parties primarily liable, may be discharged; and the several ways in
which parties secondarily liable may be discharged. When speaking
of parties primarily liable it contains no provision releasing them by
the holder's extending the time for payment or postponing his right
to enforce the instrument. When speaking of persons secondarily
liable, it does provide that they may be released by such an agreement.
The question of a release of a party by the extension of time of payment being thus present in the legislative mind, it is evident that It
it was intended that a person primarily liable should be released it
"Morehead v. Citizens Deposit Bank, 130 Ky. 414, 113 S. W. 501
(1908); Farmers'Bank of WickZiffe v. Wickliffe, 131 Ky. 787, 116 S. W.
269 (1909); 134 Ky.627, 121 S. W. 498 (1909)' (second appeal); Davis,
et al. v. Bank of Clarkson, 144 Ky. 417, 138 S. W. 246 (1911).
1"Fritts v. Kirchdorfer, 136 Ky. 643, 124 S. W. 882 (1910).
14
outhern National Bank v. Schink7er, et al., 159 Ky. 372, 167
S. W. 148 (1914); 160 Ky. 813, 170 S. W. 813 (1914) (second appeal).
See also Levy v. Roth, supra, note 10, and Daviess County Bank &
Trust Co. v. Wright, supra, note 5, where the notes were executed
prior to the Act, but the extension was granted after the effective
date of the Act.
164 Ky. 143, 175 S. W. 10.
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would have so provided in the Act. Having covered the entire subject
of discharge and release from liability, and having provided that
parties secondarily liable may be released by an extension of time,
without any such provision affecting parties primarily liable, it is
reasonable to conclude that the legislature did not intend that parties
primarily liable should be so released."

After the decision in the Williams ease the question was
again before the Court on four occasions. In one case, 1' wherein
the Act was brought to the attention of the Court, the common
law rule was recognized. In two of the cases, 17 the rule was recognized although the Act was not mentioned. In the fourth
case,' 5 where the note contained an express provision waiving
the defense of extension of time for payment, the Court, presumably recognizing the conflict in its previous rulings on the sub-

ject, held that the provision in the note was controlling and that,
therefore, "we need not inquire whether under the Negotiable
Instrument Act a surety may be released by an extension of time

granted to his principal."
The vast majority of jurisdictions have accepted the reasoning in the Williams case on the question-' 9 A late recognized
authority on the subject of Negotiable Instruments, was of the
opinion that such a situation was covered by Section 119 (4) of
the Act, providing that the instrument is discharged by any
act that will discharge a simple contract, and that if this is not

so then it should be regarded as an omitted case governed by the
law merchant under Section 196 of the Act. 20
is not a part of the Kentucky Act.

The latter section

The Act is silent as to the effect on a party primarily liable

if the holder releases collateral belonging to the principal debtor.
It is likewise silent on the question of the holder's failing to
apply a deposit of moneys, which is in his possession, belonging

to the principal debtor at the maturity of the note in liquidation
or payment thereof.

Yet it is held that the release of collateral

by the holder to the principal debtor, 21 and the failure of the
"Marshall v. Hollingsworth, 166 Ky. 190, 179 S. W. 34 (1915).
2 Staib v. German Ins. Bank, 179 Ky. 118, 200 S. W. 322 (1918);
Wagers v. Black, 212 Ky. 361, 279 S. W. 342 (1926).
8Peoples State Bank v. Atwood, 212 Ky. 462, 279 S. W. 670 (1926).
"See cases collected in 48 A. L. R. 715; 65 A. L. R. 1425.
" Brannan, The Negotiable Instrument Law (3rd Ed.) (1920),
p. 313.
2'Royster v. Heck, 14 K. L. R. 141, 266 (1892); Elsey v. Peoples
Bank of Bardwell, 166 Ky. 386, 179 S. W. 392 (1915); 168 Ky. 701, 182
S. W. 873 (1916) (first opinion withdrawn and holding that such de-
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holder to apply a deposit held at the maturity of the note,22 will
release the sureties from all liability on the instrument and that
such defenses have not been abrogated by the Negotiable Instrument Act. If the legal maxim, "the expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another"-on which the reasoning in the
Williams case is based-is to be applied, logical consistency
would require its application to other defenses as well as that of
extension of time for payment. That the question of extension
of time was in the mind of the legislature, as evidenced by the
fact that the Act provides for the discharge of a party secondarily liable by an extension of time, does not seem a complete
answer.
As the Court has declared that a payee of a note cannot be
a holder in due course, 23 and as Section 58 of the Act specifically
provides that a negotiable instrument in the hands of any holder
other than a holder in due course is subject to the same defenses
as if it were non-negotiable, the above section should be controlling and the sureties allowed to rely on the common law defense of extension if the note is in the hands of the payee. In
other jurisdictions, wherein a payee cannot be a holder in due
24
course, it is so held.
It would seem that on principle and upon a fair construction of the Act, there is no reason to change the common law
rule and that the conclusion reached in the Williams case is
fense was abrogated by the Act); Darlana v. First National Bank,
177 Ky. 261, 197 S. W. 826 (1917); Southern National Life Realty CorVoraton v. Peoples Bank of Bardstown. 178 Ky. 80, 198 S. W. 543
(1917) (overruling second and reinstating first opinion in Elsey v.
Peoples Bank of Bardwell). Opinion modified, 179 Ky. 113, 200 S. W.
313 [1918]).
2PursifuZl v. Pineville Banking Co., 97 Ky. 154, 30 S. W. 203
(1895); Bank of Taylorsville v. Hardesty, 28 K. L. R. 1285, 91 S. W.
729 (1906); Planters State Bank v. Sclamp, 124 Ky. 295, 99 S. W. 216
(1907); Burgess v. Deposit Bank of Sadieville, 30 K. L. R. 177, 97 S. W.
761 (1906); ,Southern National Life Realty Corporatson v. Peoples
Bank of Bardstown, supra, note 21; Fitzpatrick'sAdm. v. Citizens Bank
Trust Co., 231 Ky. 202, 21 S. W. (2d) 254 (1929).
Deposits made subsequent to the maturity of the note will not
release sureties. FarmersNational Bank v. Jones, et al., 234 Ky. 591,
28 S. W. (2d) 787, 70 A. L. R. 335 (1930).
Money on deposit at maturity of note for payment of designated
creditors does not release sureties. Royse v. Winchester Bank, 148
Ky. 368, 146 S. W. 738 (1912).
S38outhern National Life Realty Corporation v. Peoples Bank of
Bardstown, supra, note 21.
214
Supra, note 19.
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unsound. The Negotiable Instrument Act is not and was not
intended to be complete codification of all laws relating to negotiable instruments and, therefore, where a situation is not cov25
ered by the Act, the common law must be looked to.
It cannot be said that the rule is inequitable to the creditor
because it is never applied unless the holder knew at the time
the extension was granted of the surety co-maker relationship. 26
Parol evidence that one is in fact a surety is admissible.2 7
In view of the authorities on the question today, it would
seem clear that Kentucky has not committed itself to the proposition that the Negotiable Instrument Act has abrogated the
common law rule.
When the question is again presented to the Court it would
seem that the Williams case must necessarily be overruled if the
note is in the hands of the original payee. 28 There seems no
good reason why the defense should not be allowed even if the
note is in the hands of a holder in due course.

2 "Our conclusion, then, is that, where the negotible instrument
act speaks, it controls; where it is silent, resort must be had to the
law merchant or the common law regulating commercial paper." Mechanics' & Farmers' Bank v. Katterjohn, 137 Ky. 427, 125 S. W. 1071
(1910).
Neel v. Harding, 2 Met. 247 (1859); Champion v. Robertson, 4
Bush 17 (1868); Young v. New Farmers' Bank, 102 Ky. 257, 43 S. W.
473 (1897); Harris-Seller Banking Co. v. Bond, 20 K. L. R. 897, 4?
S. W. 764 (1898); Turner v. Farmers'Bank, 22 K. L. R. 787, 58 S. W.
695 (1900).
"Lewis v. Hardin, 5 B. Mon. 564 (1845); Brown v. Berry, 7 Ky.
Op. 179 (1873); Chapeze v. Young, 87 Ky. 476, 9 S. W. 399 (1888);
Young v. New Farmers' Bank, supra, note 26; Craddock v. Lee, 22
K. L. R. 1651, 61 S. W. 22 (1901); Morehead v. Citivens' Deposit Bank,
supra, note 12; Swearington's Exr. v. Tyler, 132 Ky. 458, 116 S. W. 331
(1909); Basket & Nicholas v. Rudy, 186 Ky. 208, 217 S. W. 112 (1919).
But holder cannot show indorser was in fact a surety. Ky. Statutes, See. 481; First National Bank v. Bickel, 143 Ky. 754, 137 S.W.
790 (1911).
' Subsequent to the decision in the Williams case the court held
that a payee could not be a holder in due course. Supra, note 23.

